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ABSTRACT
As online fraudsters invest more resources, including purchasing
large pools of fake user accounts and dedicated IPs, fraudulent at-
tacks become less obvious and their detection becomes increasingly
challenging. Existing approaches such as average degree maximiza-
tion suer from the bias of including more nodes than necessary,
resulting in lower accuracy and increased need for manual veri-
cation. Hence, we propose HoloScope, which uses information
from graph topology and temporal spikes to more accurately de-
tect groups of fraudulent users. In terms of graph topology, we
introduce “contrast suspiciousness,” a dynamic weighting approach,
which allows us to more accurately detect fraudulent blocks, partic-
ularly low-density blocks. In terms of temporal spikes, HoloScope
takes into account the sudden bursts and drops of fraudsters’ at-
tacking paerns. In addition, we provide theoretical bounds for
how much this increases the time cost needed for fraudsters to
conduct adversarial aacks. Additionally, from the perspective of
ratings, HoloScope incorporates the deviation of rating scores in
order to catch fraudsters more accurately. Moreover, HoloScope has
a concise framework and sub-quadratic time complexity, making
the algorithm reproducible and scalable. Extensive experiments
showed that HoloScope achieved signicant accuracy improve-
ments on synthetic and real data, compared with state-of-the-art
fraud detection methods.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Online fraud has become an increasingly serious problem due to
the high prot it oers to fraudsters, which can be as much as
$5 million from 300 million fake “views” per day, according to a
report of Methbot [20] on Dec 2016. Meanwhile, to avoid detection,
fraudsters can manipulate their geolocation, internet providers, and
IP address, via large IP pools (852,992 dedicated IPs). Suppose a
fraudster has a accounts or IPs, and wants to rate or click b objects
(e.g., products) at least 200 times, as required by their customers.
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eedge density of the fraudulent block is then 200·b/(a·b) = 200/a.
We thus see that with enough user accounts or IPs, the fraudsters
can serve as many customers as they need while keeping density
low. is presents a dicult challenge for most existing fraud
detection methods.
Current dense block detection methods [4, 26, 27] maximize
the arithmetic or geometric average degree. We use “fraudulent
density” to indicate the edge density that fraudsters create for the
target objects. However, those methods have a bias of including
more nodes than necessary, especially as the fraudulent density
decreases, which we veried empirically. is bias results in low
precision, which then requires intensive manual work to verify each
user. Fraudar [11] proposed an edge weighting scheme based on
inverse logarithm of objects’ degrees to reduce this bias, which was
inspired by IDF [23, 28]. However, their weighting scheme is xed
globally and aects both suspicious and normal edges, lowering the
precision of Fraudar, which can be seen from results on semi-real
(with injected labels) and real data (see Fig. 1).
Accurately detecting fraudulent blocks of lower density requires
aggregating more sources of information. Consider the aribute
of the creation time of edges: fraudulent aacks tend to be con-
centrated in time, e.g., fraudsters may surge to retweet a message,
creating one or more sudden bursts of activity, followed by sudden
drops aer the aack is complete. Sudden bursts and drops have
not been directly considered together in previous work.
Tensor based methods [12, 26, 27] incorporate edge aributes
into a multi-way tensor formulation, e.g., IPs, rating scores and time.
However, those methods rely on time-binning to incorporate tempo-
ral information, and then treat time bins independently, which loses
information about bursts and drops, which our approach captures.
erefore, we propose HoloScope, which combines suspicious
signals from graph topology, temporal bursts and drops, and rating
deviation. Our graph topology-based weighting scheme dynami-
cally reweights objects according to our beliefs about which users
are suspicious. Temporally, HoloScope detects suspicious spikes of
bursts and drops, which increases the time cost needed for fraud-
sters to conduct an aack. In terms of rating deviation, our approach
takes into account howmuch dierence there is between an object’s
ratings given by suspicious users and non-suspicious users.
In summary, our contributions are:
• Unication of signals: we make holistic use of several
signals, namely connectivity (i.e., topology), temporal bursts
and drops, and rating deviation in a systematic way.
• eoretical analysis of fraudsters’ obstruction: we
show that if the fraudsters use less than an upper bound
of time for an aack, they will cause a suspicious drop or
burst. In other words, HoloScope obstructs fraudsters by
increasing the time they need to perform an aack.
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Figure 1: (a) and (b) show experimental results on BeerAdvocate dataset. HS-α and HS are both our methods, where the former
only uses topology information. We increase the # of injected fraudsters from 200 to 2000 for HS-α , and to 20000 for HS. e
corresponding density is shown on the horizontal axis. (c) shows accuracy results on Sina Weibo, with ground truth labels.
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Figure 2: HoloScope (HS) runs in near-linear time.
• Eectiveness: we achieved higher accuracy than the com-
petitors on semi-real and real datasets. In fact, HoloScope
using only topology information (HS-α ) outperformed the
graph-based competitors (see Fig. 1a), while HoloScope
(HS) using all aributes achieved further improvement,
and outperformed the tensor-based competitors (see Fig. 1b
and 1c).
• Scalability: HoloScope runs in subquadratic time in the
number of nodes, under reasonable assumptions. Fig. 2
shows that its running time increases near-linearly with
the number of edges.
In addition, in Microblog, Sina Weibo1 data, HoloScope achieved
higher F-measure than the competitors in detecting the ground
truth labels, with high precision and recall. e code of HoloScope
is open-sourced for reproducibility 2.
2 RELATEDWORKS
Most existing works study anomaly detection based on the density
of blocks within adjacency matrices [13, 22], or multi-way ten-
sors [26, 27]. [8] and CoreScope [25] proposed to use Shingling and
K-core algorithms respectively to detect anomalous dense block in
1 e largest Microblog service in China, hp://www.weibo.com
2hps://github.com/shenghua-liu/HoloScope
Table 1: Comparison between HoloScope and other fraud
detection algorithms.
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huge graphs. Taking into account the suspiciousness of each edge or
node in a real life graph potentially allows for more accurate detec-
tion. Fraudar [11] proposed to weight edges’ suspiciousness by the
inverse logarithm of objects’ indegrees, to discount popular objects.
[2] found that the degrees in a large community follow a power
law distribution, forming hyperbolic structures. is suggests pe-
nalizing high degree objects to avoid unnecessarily detecting the
dense core of hyperbolic community.
In addition to topological density, EdgeCentric [24] studied the
distribution of rating scores to nd the anomaly. In terms of tem-
poral aribute, the identication of burst period has been studied
in [15]. A recent work, Sleep Beauty (SB) [14] more intuitively
dened the awakening time for a paper’s citation burst for burst
period. [31] clustered the temporal paerns of text phrases and
hash tags in Twier. Meanwhile, [9, 10] modeled the time stamped
rating scores with Bayesianmodel and autoregressionmodel respec-
tively for anomalous behavior detection. Even though [6, 16, 30]
have used bursty paerns to detect review spam, a sudden drop in
temporal spikes has not been considered yet.
However, aggregating suspiciousness signals from dierent at-
tributes is challenging. [5] proposed RRF (Reciprocal Rank Fusion)
scores for combining dierent rank lists in information retrieval.
However, RRF applies to ranks, not suspiciousness scores.
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CrossSpot [12], a tensor-based algorithm, estimated the suspi-
ciousness of a block using a Poisson model. However, it did not take
into account the dierence between popular and unpopular objects.
Moreover, although CrossSpot, M-Zoom [26] and D-Cube [27] can
consider edge aributes like rating time and scores via a multi-way
tensor approach, they require a time-binning approach. When time
is split into bins, aacks which create bursts and drops may not
stand out clearly aer time-binning. e problem of choosing bin
widths for histograms was studied by Sturges [29] assuming an ap-
proximately normal distribution, and Freedman-Diaconis [7] based
on statistical dispersion. However, the binning approaches were
proposed for the time series of a single object, which is not clear
for dierent kinds of objects in a real life graph, namely, popular
products and unpopular products should use dierent bin sizes.
Belief propagation [21] is another common approach for fraud
detection which can incorporate some specic edge aributes, like
sentiment [1]. However, its robustness against adversaries which
try to hide themselves is not well understood.
CopyCatch [3] detected lockstep behavior by maximizing the
number of edges in blocks constrained within time windows. How-
ever, this approach ignores the distribution of edge creation times
within the window, and does not capture bursts and drops directly.
Finally, we summarize our competitors compared to our Holo-
Scope in Table 1. We use “hy-community” to indicate whether
the method can avoid detecting the naturally-formed hyperbolic
topology which is unnecessary for fraud detection. HoloScope is
the only one which considers temporal spikes (sudden bursts and
drops and multiple bursts) and hyperbolic topology, in a unied
suspiciousness framework.
3 PROPOSED APPROACH
e denition of our problem is as follows.
Problem 1 (informal definition). Given quadruplets (user ,
object , timstamp, #stars), where timestamp is the time that a user
rates an object , and #stars is the categorical rating scores.
- Find a group of suspicious users, and suspicious objects or
its rank list with suspiciousness scores,
- to optimize the metric under the common knowledge of
suspiciousness from topology, rating time and scores.
To make the problem more general, timestamps and #stars are
optional. For example, in Twier, we have (user ,object , timestamp)
triples, where user retweets a message object at timestamp. In a
static following network, we have pairs (user ,object), with user
following object .
As discussed in previous sections, our metric should capture the
following basic traits:
Trait 1 (Engagement). Fraudsters engage as much repower as
possible to boost customers’ objects, i.e., suspicious objects.
Trait 2 (Less Involvement). Suspicious objects seldom aract
non-fraudulent users to connect with them.
Trait 3 (Spikes: Bursts and Drops). Fraudulent aacks are
concentrated in time, sometimes over multiple waves of aacks, cre-
ating bursts of activity. Conversely, the end of an aack corresponds
to sudden drops in activity.
Trait 4 (Rating Deviation). High-rating objects seldom aract
extremely low ratings from normal users. Conversely, low-rating
objects seldom aract extremely high ratings from normal users.
us we will show in the following sections, that our proposed
metric can make holistic use of several signals, namely topology,
temporal spikes, and rating deviation, to locate suspicious users
and objects satisfying the above traits. at is the reason we name
our method as HoloScope (HS).
3.1 HoloScope metric
To give a formal denition of our metric, we describe the quadru-
plets (user , object , timstamp, #stars) as a bipartite and directed
graph G = {U ,V ,E}, which U is the source node set, V is the
sink node set, and connections E is the directed edges from U to
V . Generally, graph G is a multigraph, i.e., multiple edges can be
present between two nodes. Multiple edges mean that a user can
repeatedly comment or rate on the same product at a dierent time,
as common in practice. Users can also retweet message multiple
times in the Microblog Sina Weibo. Each edge can be associated
with rating scores (#stars), and timestamps, for which the data
structure is introduced in Subsection 3.1.2.
Our HoloScope metric detects fraud from three perspectives:
topology connection, timestamps, and rating score. To easily un-
derstand the framework, we rst introduce the HoloScope in a
perspective of topology connection. Aerwards, we show how we
aggregate the other two perspectives into the HoloScope. We rst
view G as a weighted adjacency matrix M, with the number of
multiple edges (i.e., edge frequency) as matrix elements.
Our goal is to nd lockstep behavior of a group of suspicious
source nodesA ⊂ U who act on a group of sink nodes B ⊂ V . Based
on Trait 1, the total engagement of source nodes A to sink nodes B
can be basically measured via density measures. ere are many
density measures, such as arithmetic and geometric average degree.
Our HoloScope metric allows for any such measure. However, as
the average degree metrics have a bias toward including too many
nodes, we use a measure denoted by D(A,B) as the basis of the
HoloScope, dened as:
D(A,B) =
∑
vi ∈B fA(vi )
|A| + |B | (1)
where fA(vi ) is the total edge frequency from source nodes A to a
sink node vi . fA(vi ) can also be viewed as an engagement from A
to vi , or A’s lockstep on vi , which is dened as
fA(vi ) =
∑
(uj ,vi )∈E∧uj ∈A
σji · eji (2)
where constant σ ji are the global suspiciousness on an edge, and
eji is the element of adjacency matrixM, i.e., the edge frequency
between a node pair (uj ,vi ). e edge frequency eji becomes a
binary in a simple graph. e global suspiciousness as a prior can
come from the degree, and the extra knowledge on fraudsters, such
as duplicated review sentences and unusual behaving time.
To maximize D(A,B), the suspicious source nodes A and the
suspicious sink nodes B are mutually dependent. erefore, we
introduce contrast suspiciousness in an informal denition:
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Figure 3: An intuitive view of our denitions in the Holo-
Scope.
Denition 3.1 (contrast suspiciousness). e contrast suspicious-
ness denoted as P(vi ∈ B |A) is dened as the conditional likelihood
of a sink node vi that belongs to B (the suspicious object set), given
the suspicious source nodes A.
A visualization of the contrast suspiciousness is given in Fig. 3.
e intuitive idea behind contrast suspiciousness is that in the most
case, we need to judge the suspiciousness of objects by currently
chosen suspicious users A, e.g., an object is more suspicious if very
few users not inA are connected to it (see Trait 2); the sudden burst
of an object is mainly caused by A (see Trait 3); or the rating scores
fromA to an object are quite dierent from other users (see Trait 4).
erefore, such suspiciousness makes use of the contrasts between
users in A and users not in A or the whole set.
Finally, instead of maximizing D(A,B), we maximize the follow-
ing expectation of suspiciousness D(A,B) over the probabilities
P(vi ∈ B |A):
max
A
HS(A) := E [D(A,B)]
=
1
|A| +
∑
k ∈V
P(vk |A)
∑
i ∈V
fA(vi )P(vi |A) (3)
where for simplicity we write P(vi |A) to mean P(vi ∈ B |A). 1 −
P(vi |A) is the probability of vi being a normal sink node. We
dynamically calculate the contrast suspiciousness for all the objects,
aer every choice of source nodes A.
Using this overall framework for our proposed metric HS(A), we
next show how to satisfy the remaining Traits. To do this, we dene
contrast suspiciousness P(vi |A) in a way that takes into account
various edge aributes. is will allow greater accuracy particularly
for detecting low-density blocks.
3.1.1 HS-α : Less involvement from others. Based on Trait 2, a
sink node should be more suspicious if it only aracts connections
from the suspicious source nodes A, and less from other nodes.
Mathematically, we capture this by dening
P(vi |A) ∝ q(αi ), where αi = fA(vi )
fU (vi ) (4)
where fU (vi ) is the weighted indegree of sink node vi . Similar
to fA(vi ), the edges are weighted by global suspiciousness. αi
measures the involvement ratio of A in the activity of sink node vi .
e scaling function q(·) is our belief about how this ratio relates to
suspiciousness, and we choose the exponential form q(x) = bx−1,
where base b > 1.
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rectangular blocks, with volume density around 0.84 and
0.60 respectively. e camouage is randomly biased to
columns of high degree. (b) A real data of naturally-formed
hyperbolic community, and injected dense block. e injec-
tion is 2000 × 200 with biased camouage.
As previous work showed, large communities form hyperbolic
structures, which is generated in our synthetic data (see the lower-
right block in Fig. 4a), and also exists in real BeerAdvocate data
(see Fig. 4b). For clarity, our HoloScope method are denoted as
HS-α when it is only applied on a connection graph. e results
of the synthetic data show that HS-α detected the exact dense
rectangular block (b = 128), while the other competitors included
a lot of non-suspicious nodes from the core part of hyperbolic
community resulting in low accuracy. In the beer review data from
the BeerAdvocate website, testing on dierent fraudulent density
(see Fig. 1a), our HS-α remained at high accuracy, while the other
methods’ accuracy drops quickly when the density drops below
70%.
e main idea is that HS-α can do beer because it dynamically
adjusts the weights for sink nodes, penalizing those sink nodes
that also have many connections from other source nodes not in
A. In contrast, although Fraudar proposed to penalize popular
sink nodes based their indegrees, these penalties also scaled down
the weights of suspicious edges. e Fraudar (green box) only
improved the unweighted “average degree” method (red box) by a
very limited amount. Moreover, with a heavier penalty, the “sqrt
weight” method (blue box) achieved beer accuracy on source
nodes but worse accuracy on sink nodes, since those methods used
globally xed weights, and the weights of suspicious were penalized
as well. Hence the hyperbolic structure pushes those methods to
include more nodes from its core part.
In summary, our HS-α using dynamic contrast suspiciousness
can improve the accuracy of fraud detection in ‘noisy’ graphs (con-
taining hyperbolic communities), even with low fraudulent density.
3.1.2 Temporal bursts and drops. Timestamps for edge creation
are commonly available in most real seings. If two subgroups of
Microblog users have the same number of retweets to a message,
can we say they have the same suspiciousness? As an example
shown in Fig. 5a, the red line is the time series (histogram of time
bins) of the total retweets of a message in Microblog, Sina Weibo.
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Figure 5: (a) and (b) are the time series (histogram) of a real message being retweeted in Microblog, SinaWeibo. e horizontal
axis is the seconds aer 2013 − 11 − 1. (c) illustrates our proof of time cost obstruction.
e blue doed line and green dashed line are the retweeting time
series respectively from user groupsA1 andA2. e two series have
the same area under the time series curves, i.e., the same number
of retweets. However, considering that fraudsters tend to surge to
retweet a message to reduce the time cost, the surge should create
one or more sudden bursts, along with sudden drops. erefore,
the suspiciousness of user groupsA1 andA2 become quite dierent
even though they have the same number of retweets, which cannot
be detected solely based on connections in the graph. us we
include the temporal aribute into our HoloScope framework for
dening contrast suspiciousness.
Denote the list of timestamps of edges connected to a sink node
v as Tv . To simplify notation, we use T without subscript when
talking about a single given sink nodev . Let T={(t0, c0), (t1, c1), · · · ,
(te , ce )} as the time series ofT , i.e., the histogram ofT . e count ci
is the number of timestamps in the time bin [ti − ∆t/2, ti + ∆t/2),
with bin size ∆t . e bin size of histogram is calculated according to
the maximum of Sturges criteria and the robust Freedman-Diaconis’
criteria as mentioned in related works. It is worth noticing that the
HoloScope can tune dierent bin sizes for dierent sink nodes, e.g.,
popular objects need ne-grained bins to explore detailed paerns.
Hence, the HoloScope is more exible than tensor based methods,
which use a globally xed bin size. Moreover, the HoloScope can
update the time series at a low cost when T is increasing.
To consider the burst and drop paerns described in Trait 3,
we need to decide the start point of a burst and the end point of
a drop in time series T . Let the burst point be (tm , cm ), having
the maximum value cm . According to the denition in previous
work “Sleeping Beauty”, we use an auxiliary straight line from the
beginning to the burst point to decide the start point, named the
awakening point of the burst. Fig. 5b shows the time series T (red
polygonal line) of a message from SinaWeibo, the auxiliary straight
line l (black doed line) from the lower le point (t0, c0) to upper
right point (tm , cm ), and the awakening point for the maximum
point (tm , cm ), which is dened as the point along the time series T
which maximizes the distance to l . As the doed line perpendicular
to l suggests in this gure, the awakening point (ta , ca ) satises
ta = argmax
(c,t )∈T,t<tm
|(cm − c0)t − (tm − t0)c + tmc0 − cmt0 |√
(cm − c0)2 + (tm − t0)2
(5)
Finding the awakening point for one burst is not enough, as
multiple bursts may be present. us, sub-burst points and the as-
sociated awakening points should be considered. We then propose
a recursive algorithmMultiBurst in Alg. 1 for such a purpose.
Algorithm 1MultiBurst algorithm.
Input Time series T of sink node v , beginning index i , end index j
Output A list of awakening-burst point pairs,
sam : slope of the line passing through each point pair,
∆c : altitude dierence of each point pair.
If j − i < 2 then return
(tm, cm ) = point of maximum altitude between indices i and j .
(ta, ca ) = the awakening point as Eq (5) between indices i and j .
∆cam = cm − ca , and sam = ∆cam/(tm−ta )
Append {(ta, ca ), (tm, cm )}, sam , and ∆cam into the output.
MultiBurst (T, i, a − 1)
k = Find the rst local min position from indicesm + 1 to j
Mult iBurst (T, k, j)
Aer nding awakening and burst points, the contrast suspi-
ciousness of burst awareness satises P(vi |A) ∝ q(φi ), where φi is
the involvement ratio of source nodes in A in multiple bursts. Let
the collection of timestamps from A to sink node vi be TA. en,
φi =
Φ(TA)
Φ(TU ) , and Φ(T ) =
∑
(ta,tm )
∆cam ·sam
∑
t ∈T
1(t ∈ [ta , tm ]) (6)
where sam is the slope from the output of MultiBurst algorithm.
Here sam is used as a weight based on how steep the current burst is.
is denition of suspiciousness satises Trait 3. It is worth noticing
that the MultiBurst algorithm only needs to be executed once.
With the preprocessed awakening and burst points, the contrast
suspiciousness of edges connected tov hasO(dv ) complexity, where
dv is the degree of sink node v . Hence the complexity for overall
sink nodes are O(|E |).
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In fact, sudden drops are also a prominent paern of fraudulent
behavior as described in Trait 3, since aer creating the aack is
complete, fraudsters usually stop their activity sharply. To make
use of the suspicious paern of a sudden drop, we dene the dyinд
point as the end of a drop. As Fig. 5b suggests, another auxiliary
straight line is drawn from the highest point (tm , cm ) to the last
point (te , ce ). e dying point (td , cd ) can be found by maximizing
the distance to this straight line. us we can discover the “sudden
drop” by the absolute slope value sbd=(cm − cd )/(td − tm ) between the
burst point and the dying point. Since there may be several drops in
a uctuated time series T , we choose the drop with the maximum
fall. To nd the maximum fall, we also need a recursive algorithm,
similar to Alg. 1:
1) Find a maximum point (tm , cm ), and the corresponding dying
point (td , cd ) by denition; 2) Calculate the current drop slope sbd ,
and the drop fall ∆cbd = cm − cd ; 3) Recursively nd drop slope and
drop fall for the le and right parts of T , i.e., t < tm and t ≥ td
respectively.
As a result, the algorithm returns the maximum drop fall ∆cbd ,
and its drop slope sbd , which it has found recursively. Finally, we
use the weighted drop slope ∆cbd · sbd as a global suspiciousness
in equation (2), to measure the drop suspiciousness. Each edge con-
nected to the sink node v is assigned the same drop suspiciousness.
We use a logarithm scale for smoothing those edge weights.
With this approach to detect bursts and drops, we now show
that this provides a provable time obstruction for fraudsters.
Theorem 3.2. Let N be the number of edges that fraudsters want
to create for an object. If the fraudsters use time less than τ ≥√
2N∆t (S1+S1)
S1 ·S1 , then they will be tracked by a suspicious burst or
drop, where ∆t is the size of time bins, and S1 and S2 are the slopes of
normal rise and decline respectively.
Proof. e most ecient way to create N edges is to have one
burst and one drop, otherwise more time is needed. As shown
in Fig. 5c, in order to minimize the slope, every point in the time
series should in line with the two auxiliary straight lines to the
highest point cm , separately from the awakening and dying points.
Otherwise, the slopes will exceed the normal values S1 and S2.
Hence we only consider the triangle with the auxiliary lines as its
two edges. It is worth noticing that a trapezoid whose legs have
the same slopes as the triangle’s edges cannot have a shorter time
cost. en
cm
n1∆t
= S1,
cm
n2∆t
= S2, (n1 + n2) · cm = 2N ′.
Here n1 and n2 are the number of time bins before and aer the
burst. N ′ is the total number of rating edges, and N ′ ≥ N consider
some edges from normal users. us, solving the above equations,
we have
τ = (n1 + n2)∆t =
√
2N ′∆t(S1 + S2)
S1 · S2 ≥
√
2N∆t(S1 + S2)
S1 · S2

We also have the height of burst, cm ≥
√
2N∆tS1S2
S1+S2 . us, the
maximum height of time series T cannot be larger by far than that
of a normal sink node. at is the reason that we use the weighted
φi in equation (6) and weighted drop slope in equation (2).
3.1.3 Rating deviation and aggregation. We now consider edges
with categorical aributes such as rating scores, text contents, etc.
For each sink node vi , we use the KL-divergence κi between the
distributions separately from the suspicious source nodesA and the
other nodes, i.e., U \A. We useU \A for KL-divergence instead of
the whole source nodes U , in order to avoid the trivial case where
most of the rating scores are from A. e rating deviation κi is
scaled into [0, 1] by the maximum value before being passed into
functionq(·) to compute contrast suspiciousness. e neutral scores
can be ignored in the KL-divergence for the purpose of detecting
fraudulent boosting or defamation. Moreover, rating deviation is
meaningful when bothA andU \A have the comparable numbers of
ratings. us, we weighted κi by a balance factor, min{ fA (vi )/fU \A (vi ),
fU \A (vi )/fA (vi ) }.
To make holistic use of dierent signals, i.e., topology, temporal
spikes, and rating deviation, we need a way to aggregate those
signals together. We have tried to use RRF (Reciprocal Rank Fusion)
scores from Information Retrieval, and wrapped the scores with
and without scaling function q(x). Compared to RRF score, we
found that a natural way of joint probability by multiplying those
signals together:
P(vi |A) = bαi+φi+κi−3, (7)
was the most eective way to aggregate. In a joint probability,
we can consider the absolute suspicious value of each signal, as
opposite to the only use of ranking order. Moreover, being wrapped
with q(x), the signal values cannot be canceled out by multiplying
a very small value from other signals. A concrete example is that
a suspicious spike can still keep a high suspiciousness score by
multiplying a very small score from low fraudulent density.
Moreover, HoloScope dynamically updates the contrast suspi-
ciousness P(vi |A). us the sink nodes being added with camou-
age will have a very low contrast suspiciousness, with respect to
the suspicious source nodesA. is oers HoloScope the resistance
to camouage.
3.2 Algorithm
Before designing the full algorithm for large scale datasets, we
rstly introduce the most important sub-procedureGreedyShavinд
in Alg. 2.
At the beginning, this greedy shaving procedure starts with an
initial set A0 ⊂ U as input. It then greedily deletes source nodes
from A, according to users’ scores S:
S(uj ∈ A) =
∑
vi :(uj ,vi )∈E
σ ji · eji · P(vi |A),
which can be interpreted as how many suspicious nodes that user
uj is involved in. So the user is less suspicious if he has a smaller
score, with respect to the current contrast suspiciousness P, where
we use P to denote a vector of contrast suspiciousness of all sink
nodes. We build a priority tree to help us eciently nd the user
with minimum score. e priority tree updates the users’ scores
and maintains the new minimum as the priorities change. With
removing source nodes A, the contrast suspiciousness P change,
in which we then update users’ scores S. e algorithm keeps
reducing A until it is empty. e best A∗ maximizing objective HS
and P(v |A∗) are returned at the end.
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Algorithm 2 GreedyShavinд Procedure.
Given bipartite multigraph G(U , V , E),
initial source nodes A0 ⊂ U .
Initialize:
A = A0
P= calculate contrast suspiciousness given A0
S = calculate suspiciousness scores of source nodes A.
MT = build priority tree of A with scores S.
while A is not empty do
u = pop the source node of the minimum score from MT .
A = A \ u , delete u from A.
Update P with respect to new source nodes A.
Update MT with respect to new P.
HS = estimate objective as Equation (3).
end while
return A∗ that maximizes objective HS (A∗) and P (v |A∗), v ∈ V .
Since awakening and burst points have been already calculated
for each sink node as an initial step before the GreedyShavinд
procedure, the calculation of the contrast suspicious P(v |A) for a
sink node v only needs O(|A|) time. With source node j as the j-th
one removed from A0 by theGreedyShavinд procedure, |A0 | =m0,
and the out degree as di , the complexity is∑
j=2, · · · ,m0
O(dj · (j − 1) · logm0) = O(m0 |E0 | logm0) (8)
where E0 is the set of edges connected to source nodes A0.
With theGreedyShavinд procedure, our scalable algorithm can
be designed so as to generate candidate suspicious source node sets.
In our implementation, we use singular vector decomposition (SVD)
for our algorithm. Each top singular vector gives a spectral view of
high connectivity communities. However, those singular vectors
are not associated with suspiciousness scores. us combined with
the top singular vectors, our fast greedy algorithm is given in Alg. 3.
Theorem 3.3 (Algorithm complexity). In the graph G(U ,V ,E),
given |V | = O(|U |) and |E | = O(|U |ϵ0 ), the complexity of FastGreedy
algorithm is subquadratic, i.e., o(|U |2) in lile-o notation, if the size
of truncated user set |U˜ (k ) | ≤ |U |1/ϵ , where ϵ > max{1.5, 23−ϵ0 }.
Proof. e FastGreedy algorithm executesGreedyShavinд in a
constant iterations. A0 is assigned to U˜ (k ) in everyGreedyShavinд
procedure. enm0 = |A0 | = |U˜ (k ) |. In the adjacency matrixM of
the graph, we consider the submatrixM0 with A0 as rows andV as
columns. If the fraudulent dense block is in submatrixM0, then we
assume that the block has at most O(m0) columns. Excluding the
dense block, the remaining part ofM0 is assumed to have the same
density with the whole matrixM. erefore, the total number of
edges inM0 is
O(|E0 |) = O(m20 +
m0 · |E |
|U | ) = O(|U |
2/ϵ + |U |1/ϵ−1 |E |)
en based on equation (8), the algorithm complexity is
O(m0 |E0 | logm0) = O((|U |3/ϵ + |U |2/ϵ−1+ϵ0 ) log |U |)
erefore, if ϵ > max{1.5, 23−ϵ0 }, then the complexity is sub-
quadratic o(|U |2). 
In real life graph, ϵ0 ≤ 1.6, so if ϵ > 1.5 the complexity of
FastGreedy algorithm is subquadratic. erefore, without loss
of performance and eciency, we can limit |U˜ (k ) | ≤ |U |1/1.6 for
truncating an ordered U in the FastGreedy algorithm for a large
dataset.
In FastGreedy algorithm for HS-α , SVD on adjacency matrixM
is used to generate initial blocks for the GreedyShavinд procedure.
Although we can still use SVD onM for HS with holistic aributes,
yet considering aributes of timestamps and rating scores may
bring more benets. Observing that not every combination of # of
stars, timestamps and product ids has a value in a multi-way tenor
representation, we can only choose every existing triplets (object ,
timestamp, #stars) as one column, and user as rows, to form a new
matrix. e above transformation is called thematricization of a
tensor, which outputs a new matrix. With proper time bins, e.g.,
one hour or day, and re-clustering of #stars , the aening matrix
becomes more dense and contains more aribute information. us
we use such a aening matrix with each column weighted by the
sudden-drop suspiciousness for our FastGreedy algorithm.
Algorithm 3 FastGreedy Algorithm for Fraud detection.
Given bipartite multigraph G(U , V , E).
L = get rst several le singular vectors
for all L(k ) ∈ L do
Rank source nodes U decreasingly on L(k )
U˜ (k ) = truncate u ∈ U when L(k )u ≤ 1√|U |
GreedyShavinд with initial U˜ (k ).
end for
return the best A∗ with maximized objective HS (A∗),
and the rank of v ∈ V by fA∗ (v) · P (v |A∗).
4 EXPERIMENTS
Table 2: Data Statistics
Data Name #nodes #edges time span
BeerAdvocate [18] 26.5K x 50.8K 1.07M Jan 08 - Nov 11
Yelp 686K x 85.3K 2.68M Oct 04 - Jul 16
Amazon Phone & Acc [17] 2.26M x 329K 3.45M Jan 07 - Jul 14
Amazon Electronics [17] 4.20M x 476K 7.82M Dec 98 - Jul 14
Amazon Grocery [17] 763K x 165K 1.29M Jan 07 - Jul 14
Amazon mix category [19] 1.08M x 726K 2.72M Jan 04 - Jun 06
In the experiments, we only consider the signicant multiple
bursts for uctuated time series of sink nodes. We keep those
awakening-burst point pairs with the altitude dierence ∆c at least
50% of the largest altitude dierence in the time series. Table 2
gives the statistics of our six datasets which are publicly available
for academic research 3. Our extensive experiments showed that
the performance was insensitive to scaling base b, and became
very stable when larger than 32. Hence we choose b = 32 in the
following experiments.
3Yelp dataset is from hps://www.yelp.com/dataset challenge
Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA Shenghua Liu,1,2,∗ Bryan Hooi,2 Christos Faloutsos2
Table 3: Experimental results on real data with injected labels
Data Name metrics*
source nodes sink nodes
M-Zoom D-Cube CrossSpot HS M-Zoom D-Cube CrossSpot HS
BeerAdvocate
auc 0.7280 0.7353 0.2259 0.9758 0.6221 0.6454 0.1295 0.9945
F≥90% 0.5000 0.5000 – 0.0333 0.5000 0.5000 – 0.0333
Yelp
auc 0.9019 0.9137 0.9916 0.9925 0.9709 0.8863 0.0415 0.9950
F≥90% 0.2500 0.2000 0.0200 0.0143 0.0250 1.0000 – 0.0100
Amazon auc 0.9246 0.8042 0.0169 0.9691 0.9279 0.8810 0.0515 0.9823
Phone & Acc F≥90% 0.1667 0.5000 – 0.0200† 0.1429 0.1000 – 0.0200†
Amazon auc 0.9141 0.9117 0.0009 0.9250 0.9142 0.7868 0.0301 0.9385
Electronics F≥90% 0.2000 0.1250 – 0.1000 0.1000 0.5000 – 0.1250
Amazon auc 0.8998 0.8428 0.0058 0.9250 0.8756 0.8241 0.0200 0.9621
Grocery F≥90% 0.1667 0.5000 – 0.1000 0.1250 0.2500 – 0.1000
Amazon auc 0.9001 0.8490 0.5747 0.9922 0.9937 0.9346 0.0157 0.9950
mix category F≥90% 0.2500 0.5000 0.2000† 0.0167 0.0100 0.2000 – 0.0100
* we use the two metrics: the area under the curve (abbrev as low-case “auc”) of the accuracy curve as drawn in Fig. 1b, and the lowest
detect ion density that the method can detect in high accuracy(≥ 90%).
† one of the above fraudulent density was not detected in high accuracy.
4.1 Evaluation on dierent injection density
In the experiments, we mimic the fraudsters’ behaviors and ran-
domly choose 200 objects that has no more than 100 indegree as
the fraudsters’ customers, since less popular objects are more likely
to buy fake ratings. On the other hand, the fraudulent accounts
can come from the hijacked user accounts. us we can uniformly
sample out a number of users from the whole user set as fraud-
sters. To test on dierent fraudulent density, the number of sampled
fraudsters ranges from 200 to 20000. ose fraudsters as a whole
randomly rate each of the 200 products for 200 times, and also
create some biased camouage on other products. As a results, the
fraudulent density ranges from 1.0 to 0.01 for testing. e rating
time was generated for each fraudulent edge: rst randomly choos-
ing a start time between the earliest and the latest creation time
of the existing edges; and then plus a randomly and biased time
interval from the intervals of exiting creation time, to mimic the
surge of fraudsters’ aacks. Besides, a high rating score, e.g. 4 or
4.5, is randomly chosen for each fraudulent edge4.
Fig. 1b shows the results of HoloScope HS on the BeerAdvocate
data. When the fraudulent density decreases from the right to the
le along the horizontal axis, HS can keep as high F-measure on
accuracy as more than 80% before reaching 0.025 in density, beer
by far than the competitors. Since HS returns suspiciousness scores
for sink nodes, we measure their accuracy using AUC (the area
under the ROC curve), where ROC stands for receiver operating
characteristic. For the detection of suspicious objects, HS achieved
more than 0.95 in AUC for all the testing injection density, with a
majority of tests reaching to 1.0.
In order to give a comparison on all six data sets with dierent
injection density, we propose to use the two metrics: a low-case
“auc” and the lowest detection density, described in the notes of
Table 3. e table reports the fraud detection results of our Holo-
Scope (HS) and competitors on the six datasets. Since the accuracy
curve stops at 0.01 (the minimum testing density); and we add zero
accuracy at zero density, the ideal value of auc is 0.995. e auc
on source and sink nodes are reported separately. As the table
4 the injection code is also open-sourced for reproducibility
suggests, our HS achieved the best auc among the competitors,
and even reached the ideal auc in two cases. Since the HS outputs
the suspiciousness scores for sink nodes, we used the area under
the upper-case AUC (similar to F-measure) accuracy curve along
all testing density. Although it is sometimes unfair to compare
F-measure with AUC, since the smallest value of AUC is around
0.5, yet the high auc values can indicate the high F-measure values
on our top suspicious list.
Furthermore, we compare the lowestdetection density in Table 3.
e beer a method is, the lower density it should be able to detect
well. As we can see, HS has the smallest detection density in most
cases, which can be as small as 200/14000= 0.0143 on source nodes,
and reached the minimum testing density of 0.01 on sink nodes.
at means we can detect fraudsters in high accuracy even if they
use 14 thousand accounts to create 200 × 200 fake edges for 200
objects. e fraudulent objects can also be detected accurately, even
if 20 thousand fraudsters are hired to create 200 fake edges for each
object.
4.2 Evaluation on Sina Weibo with real labels
We also did experiments on a large real dataset from Sina Weibo,
which has 2.75 million users, 8.08 million messages, and 50.1 million
edges in Dec 2013. e user names and ids, and message ids are
from the online system. us we can check their existence status
in the system to evaluate the experiments. If the messages or the
users were deleted from the system, we treat them as the basis for
identifying suspicious users and messages. Since it is impossible to
check all of the users and messages, we rstly collected a candidate
set, which is the union of the output sets from the HS and the
baseline methods. e real labels are from the candidate set by
checking the status whether they still exists in Sina Weibo (checked
in Feb. 2017). We used a program on the API service of Sina Weibo
to check the candidate user and message id lists, nally resulting
in 3957 labeled users and 1615 labeled messages.
e experimental results in Fig. 1c show that HS achieved high
F-measure on accuracy, which detected 3781 labeled users higher
than M-Zoom’s 1963 labeled users. e F-measure of HS improved
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about 30% and 60%, compared with M-Zoom and D-Cube respec-
tively. CrossSpot biased to include a large amount of users in their
detection results, which detected more than 100 labeled users but
with extremely low precision, i.e., less than 1%. at is the reason
CrossSpot got the lowest F-measure, which is less than 1.5%. For
labeled messages, the HS achieved around 0.8 in AUC, while M-
Zoom and D-Cube got lower recall, and CrossSpot still suered
very low F-measure with higher recall. erefore, our HoloScope
outperformed the competitors in real-labeled data as well.
4.3 Scalability
To verify the complexity, we choose two representative datasets:
BeerAdvocate data which has the highest volume density, and Ama-
zon Electronics which has the most edges. We truncated the two
datasets according to dierent time ranges, i.e., from the past 3
months, 6 months, or several years to the last day, so that the gen-
erated data size increases. Our algorithm is implemented in Python.
As shown in Fig. 2, the running time of our algorithm increases
almost linearly with the number of the edges.
5 CONCLUSION
We proposed a fraud detection method, HoloScope, on a bipartite
graph which can have timestamps and rating scores. HoloScope
has the following advantages: 1) Unication of signals: we make
holistic use of several signals, namely topology, temporal spikes,
and rating deviation in our suspiciousness framework in a system-
atic way. 2)eoretical analysis of fraudsters’ obstruction: we
showed that if the fraudsters use less than an upper bound of time
to rate an object, they will cause a suspicious drop or burst. In other
words, our HoloScope can obstruct fraudsters and increases their
time cost. 3) Eectiveness: we achieved higher accuracy on both
semi-real and real datasets than the competitors, achieving good
accuracy even when the fraudulent density is low. 4) Scalability:
while HoloScope needs to dynamically update the suspiciousness
of objects, the algorithm is sub-quadratic in the number of nodes,
under reasonable assumptions.
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